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Research on Money and
Finance is a network of political economists that have a track record in researching money and finance. It aims to generate analytical work on the development of the monetary and the financial system in recent years. A further aim is to produce synthetic work on the transformation of the capitalist economy, the rise of financialisation and the resulting intensification of crises. RMF carries research on both developed and developing countries and welcomes contributions that draw on all currents of political economy. interference and political abuses (Shaw 1973; McKinnon 1973; Pazos 1982; Balassa 1982) . Ideally, the release of competitive forces would usher in a new era of growth, stability, and prosperity. Inequality and difference would naturally persist, but with the rising fortunes of business and capital all of society would benefit. Yet actually existing finance-led neoliberalism has borne little resemblance to the theory.
Research on Money and Finance
According to the United Nations" World Economic and Social Survey, "instead of increasing investment and growth, capital and financial market liberalization had the opposite effect by increasing volatility and uncertainty" (DESA 2010, 103) . Recurrent crises in Mexico have worsened inequality and intensified redistributive struggles (Teichman 2008) . After all said and done, neoclassical economists have had to concede that the growth benefits of capital account liberalization have been oversold (Kose et al. 2009 ). Nonetheless, financial capital today enjoys not only great prosperity despite the global financial crisis but also unparalleled and undiminished economic, social, and political power (Albo, Gindin, and Panitch 2010) . 2 How is this so?
The dimensions of this problem are many and complex. I enter into this debate by drawing attention to a specific dimension of neoliberalism and its evermore finance-led form today, namely the socialization of financial risk at times of 2 Financial capital refers collectively and in general to money and banking capital, the financial institutions dealing in this form of capital, and the upper fraction of individuals and collectives that own and control these institutions (Duménil and Lévy 2004, 660) .
political economic crisis. 3 Looking at the experiences of Mexican society since the 1980s, I do so from the unique and under-theorized vantage point of labour.
Furthermore, I understand the socialization of financial risks as part of broader processes of market-oriented neoliberal restructuring of the Mexican social formation. In Mexico and more generally, this restructuring has involved crafting a more enabling environment for domestic and foreign financial capital to profit alongside the defeat of organized labour"s and popular classes" capacity to resist neoliberal restructuring and the increased structural power of capital (Glyn 2006; Marois 2008; Harvey 2010) . As illustrated below, state elites have developed institutional mechanisms so that when financial capital hits a point of crisis, their risks gone sour can be drawn into the state, but -and this is crucial -in such a way that the costs of absorbing the risks fall disproportionately onto Mexican labour and the popular classes.
Of course, the state apparatus has always been involved in dealing with many diverse and social reproductive risks from facilitating productive and infrastructure capacity to environmental management to national security (cf., Giddens 1990; Beck 1992) . In terms of the rise of finance internationally and in Mexico, there are many specific forms of financial risks that involve complex combinations of foreign currency loans, short-term capital flows, bankers" related lending, high risk loan operations, and derivatives to name a few. Yet these forms of financial risk share common ground as a means to accumulate future wealth; in their profit orientation; as based in competitive capital accumulation and associated unequal social interactions between capital and labour processes; and as essentially speculative and uncertain since the future realization of the financial risk as profit is not guaranteed (see Harney 2010; Toms 2010; Harvey 2010; cf. Hilferding 2006) .
In what follows, I frame the chief paradox today to be not that financial capital has risen to the commanding heights of power in Mexico and internationally despite recurrent financial volatility (though this is vitally important). Rather, the paradox of concern here is that in spite of forming the bedrock of financial capital"s stability, prosperity, and power the popular and working classes in Mexico find themselves in the position of being institutionally responsible for and politically subordinate to the fate of financial capital within its borders. An understudied aspect of this paradox, I
argue, can be grasped as a class-based process involving the socialization of financial risks -or when the government and financial state managers can coordinate a response to financial crisis institutionally premised on drawing the worst financial risks into the state to diffuse the costs of risk onto society at large. Without having crafted this institutionalized state capacity over time and through processes of struggle over social resources, the power and prosperity enjoyed by financial capital in Mexico today is unimaginable. In this light, while insufficient to explain the entirety of neoliberal changes since the 1980s, the socialization of financial risks appears as a necessary and historically constitutive of neoliberalism"s finance-led form in Mexico today. 4 The argument proceeds by first locating socialization in the literature, second by establishing an alternative analytical framework, and third by exploring Mexico"s three conjunctural neoliberal crises, which is followed by a conclusion.
LOCATING THE SOCIALIZATION OF FINANCIAL RISKS
As the global financial system teetered on the brink of collapse in October 2008, the (Teichman 2008; Arestis and Caner 2010) . As opposed to more aggressive market discipline, institutionalists have emphasized the need for extra-market coordination to avoid financial growth negatively impacting real economic growth and stability. Howard Stein (2010) rebukes the more open financial markets of neoliberalism arguing instead that this practice should be abandoned. James Crotty argues that the deep cause of the current financial crisis "is to be found in the flawed institutions and practices of the current financial regime" marked by financial liberalization and growing moral hazard (2009, 564) . 6 In the case of Mexico the rise of financial capital has also institutionalized informal state actions to rescue large financial firms, actions that in turn increase public debt and moral hazard (Garrido 2005, 19; 28) . Agreeing these practices should end, institutionalists also point towards crafting an effective and transparent regulatory framework in Mexico so that the efficiency gains of expanded 6 In an earlier version of this argument, Crotty argues, "the large financial gains of the boom were private, but losses in the crisis were socialized. These bailouts convinced individual and institutional investors that that gains in the boom would far exceed losses in the bust. This created a classic moral hazard problem that contributed to a secular rise in the absolute and relative size of financial markets, as well to increasing inequality" (2008, 10) . market operations can be realized without the "taxpayers having to "socialize" the losses" (Ramírez 2001, 657-58 ; also see Stallings 2006 
FRAMING A HISTORICAL MATERIALIST INTERPRETATION
For present purposes, the historical materialist interpretation presented here brings forth three analytical tools that differentiate it from mainstream analyses in a way helpful to interpreting the socialization of financial risks. First, it is necessary to begin with an understanding of the world we live and interact in through a theory of internal relations and conceptualization of totality (see Ollman 2003, Ch. 5 (Haber 2005) . Rather, at the most abstract level, capitalist states are understood as social relations insofar as they comprise of institutionalizations of historically specific class, racial, and gendered power struggles. This interpretation follows in the tradition of Nicos Poulantzas who saw the capitalist state as "the factor which concentrates, condenses, materializes and incarnates politico-ideological relations in a form specific to the given mode of production" (2000, 27) . Conceived of within a wider totality of capitalist society, this institutionally organized political arena appears relatively separate from markets as a form of state-society relations specific to
capitalism. Yet states and markets in essence remain two expressions of a single pattern of social relations under capitalism (Poulantzas 2000, 17-9) .
Understanding the state in both its capitalist generality and Mexican specificity is important. The specific form and content of states vary in time and place relative to local specificities, power struggles, institutional differences, and so on while remaining party and subject to the imperatives of world market competitive and the social logic capitalist reproduction. For example, the internationalization of the state since the 1970s in general has been a response of state elites most 8 On Marxian state theory debates, see Jessop 1990 and Carnoy 1987. everywhere to mounting world market competitive imperatives (Poulantzas 1974; Picciotto 1991) . In emerging capitalisms like Mexico, the processes of internationalization have involved state and government elites restructuring the state in such a way that that the institutions and agencies therein are more and more materially disciplined and institutionally prompted to accept responsibility for managing its domestic capitalist order in a way that contributes to managing continuity in the world market (Marois 2010) . At the same time, internationalization since the 1980s has seen these same actors within the state insulating the financial apparatus from domestic political influence to conform to international financial institution norms (notably this has involved central bank independence, inflation targeting, and wider liberal calls for so-called "de-politicization"). Such neoliberal policy matrices mediate and support international competitiveness in a way that enables financialization at home and in the world market. This tendency towards the universalization of world market financial and competitive imperatives within the Mexican state, however, is mediated and differentiated by the institutional forms specific to Mexican society and the historical formation of the class compromises necessary for the production of value by labour.
The socialization of financial risk forms a key aspect of this social struggle.
The socialization process is understood as struggle because it is over the determination of the social resources collected by and distributed through the state apparatus. As J.S. Toms argues, because powerful social groups in society are able to transfer risks onto weaker groups, which is rational from the perspective of dominant capitals, the institutions of capitalism have developed around this process (2010, 97; 101) . More will be said on this below, but the capitalist state"s historically Finally, following on this there is a need to specify how government elites and state managers are in fact able to socialize financial risks at times of crisis, especially when the resources required to do so often exceed available state resources at the moment of crisis. This leads us to the credit system and the concept of fictitious capital. Drawing on the elaborations of Marx by Rudolf Hilferding, the credit system at base pools together the money of many people to channel it for the usage of a few people (2006, 180) . Because of this, the credit system enables the creation and circulation of fictitious capital. According to Hilferding, fictitious capital is a capitalized claim to or share of future revenue (2006, 128) . Harvey, too, argues fictitious capital is created whenever credit is given based on a claim against future labour (1999, . This process entails in-built risks because fictitious values precede the real values created in production. Add to this that capital accumulation and the financing of development have become exponentially more dependent on recurrent flows of fictitious capital and, as a result, progressively more "finance-led".
The creation of fictitious capital, however, is not restricted to the private sector and their speculative financial dealings, which dominate the literature.
Hilferding also suggested that states create fictitious capital through the sale of state bonds -that is, the price of a share in the annual tax yield of a state or a capitalized claim to future tax revenue (2006, 111 (Bennett and Sharpe 1980, 180) . By the mid 1970s, the state sector was absorbing about two-thirds of all private bank assets to cover financing its needs, up from about a fifth from 1947 to 1966, leading to tensions between the state and bankers (FitzGerald 1985, 227) . Importantly, the Lopez Portillo government introduced a new consumption tax, a value added tax (VAT) of 10 percent in 1980, as part of its tax reforms to increase state revenues. Due to the range of loopholes for firms and that VAT targets individual consumption rather than business, capital in Mexico did not openly oppose the tax (Elizondo 1994, 175 ). We will return to the importance of the VAT later.
The breaking point for Mexico"s state-led development strategy came with the 1979 to 1982 Volcker shock that instigated a swift rise in interest rates globally that made Mexico"s growing foreign debts unbearable. By the second half of 1981, the economy was suffering from high inflation and dependency on the petrol income from the publically owned and controlled PEMEX amidst falling world market oil prices.
Public debt expanded to compensate for lost oil revenues, exacerbated by the preceding policy of "Mexicanization". Those who held money capital in Mexico began to lose faith in the future value of the peso exchange rate, sparking a massive conversion of pesos into US dollars thereby draining Mexico"s international reserves.
Of the near $60 billion in public debt accumulated prior to 1982 by the Lopez Portillo administration, 38 to 53 percent financed this capital flight (Buffie 1989, 155 (Cypher 1989, 65-6) . Entering into these agreements reduced Mexico"s financial risk premium such that foreign direct and portfolio capital flowed back in and helped to legitimize the strategy of liberalization. Mexican officials could fund mounting debts through state bands, in effect promises to pay in the future based on future state revenues. Due to the historical political and economic structure of Mexican finances, the responsibility would fall disproportionately onto the majority of working, working poor, and the peasantry in Mexico. In effect, the class dynamics of fictitious capital has everything to do with the unequal tax structure of Mexico. On this we must pause for a moment.
In Mexico, domestic elites have historically penetrated the process of public taxation determination to their benefit. While Mexico"s corporatist state-society structure has drawn in the capital, labour, and the peasantry sectors into the state, capital in Mexico has enjoyed the most privileged access to and influence over state tax policy formation (Elizondo 1994, 161-3) . As a result, the wealthy have been able to avoid taxation through institutionalized loopholes and weak enforcement, but average wage earners cannot easily escape income tax and have therefore borne Mexico"s specific context perhaps facilitates this problem even more so. By the 1980s, Mexico brandished among the lowest taxation levels when compared to similar emerging capitalist societies. The state revenue generated from oil and PEMEX had enabled past governments to demand relatively little tax from Mexican capital as part of its post war developmental strategy. In the 1960s, for example, the PRI collected only 6.31 percent of GDP in taxation, of which only 2.41 percent was income tax (Elizondo 1994, 162) . The introduction of the VAT in 1980 generated additional tax revenue in the range of 2.7 to 3.3 percent of GDP by the late 1980s and early 1990s (Elizondo 1994, 184) . By the mid 1990s, the OECD reports federal government revenues at around 15 percent of GDP, of which PEMEX contributed 2.2 percent and other non-tax revenue 1.7 percent. Of specific tax revenues, income tax contributed 5.1 percent and VAT 2.7 percent, with excise taxes and import duties contributing 2.0 and 0.9 percent respectively (OECD 1998, 57 (OECD 2009, 60 ).
Yet for labour, the working poor, and peasantry, the VAT is a regressive tax that falls disproportionately on the poor because they pay a greater proportion of whatever income they have to tax, which is hidden from them in the price paid for goods and services. VAT in effect is taxation by stealth, and an institutional mechanism increasingly used under neoliberal strategies of development to the benefit of business. As even one neoclassical researcher recognizes, "a tax on consumption and a tax on labor income are positively related, as both shift resources away from labor" (Meza 2008 (Meza , 1252 . The point being that in Mexico a large and growing proportion of state revenue is drawn from the majority of Mexicans" income and consumption, a majority composed of the working class, working poor, and peasantry. At the same time, the other significant source of state income comes from PEMEX, a state-owned enterprise arguably "owned" by the majority of Mexicans albeit controlled by state and government elites. These recurrent revenues form the material basis of the Mexican state"s capacity to socialize financial risks through fictitious capital creation, which has become institutionalized since the 1980s.
Indeed, without the majority of Mexicans working and paying tax (income or consumption) and without the revenue from PEMEX, the creation of state bonds to cover the risks of financial capital in Mexico is simply impossible. In this reasoning, there is a definite material basis to socialization that is rooted in the class dynamics of capitalism and the capitalist state. We can now proceed to how socialization changed form, but not content, in the 1994-95 peso crisis. Reserve took the lead in organizing an IMF (which alone contributed $18 billion to the rescue, its largest loan to date), Bank for International Settlements, and Canadian government $50 billion financial liquidity package in early 1995 (OECD 1995, 160) . Since honouring short-term debts was a political priority, the first $29 billion went to settling the Tesobonos directly in US dollars (Sidaoui 2005, 217) . The initial bail out enabled President Zedillo to overcome the worst of the peso crisis, but the now privatized banks remained in an unsustainable position.
The 1994 devaluation had also caused the peso value of the Mexican banks"
foreign denominated debts to rise abruptly, which immediately exposed vast quantities of large and intertwined Mexican family and business groups" debt (related loans) to default risk putting the entire banking system at risk (Banco de México 1996, 1). (SHCP 1998, 26-7) . Having staked everything on marketoriented reforms, not even a crisis of this magnitude could shake the PRI"s commitments to neoliberalism. Facing a political and social maelstrom in a context of already waning support, the PRI still had to legitimize the public costs of rescue not as saving a few private bankers, but as necessary for the benefit of all Mexicans (SHCP 1998, 21) .
As is well known, the government subsequently injected US dollar liquidity, helped to recapitalize the banks with temporary and permanent capital resources, and helped to restructure individual debt programs (Cypher 1996; OECD 2000) . Modest recovery signs appeared and access to international capital markets improved by late 1995. The Zedillo administration had saved the banking system and avoided systemic collapse "but at a significant cost to the public treasury" (OECD 2002, 89 ). Yet the alpha and omega of the costs of preserving Mexico"s neoliberal developmental orientation were not limited to 1995, but continued to accumulate.
The BdeM at first estimated to cost of bank rescue to be about 5.5 percent of 1995 GDP (1996, 8) . By 1996, the cost rose to 8.4 percent of GDP and then to 14.3 percent by 1999 (Guillén Romo 2005, 247) . In 1998 dollar terms, the rescue was worth $60 billion, a figure five times greater than the total receipts for bank privatization just six years prior. As noted, the mounting rescue costs outstripped the institutional capacity and political mandate of Fobaproa, generating uncertainty for Mexico in financial markets. In response, and amidst great public outcry, dissent, and months of political debate, President Zedillo with opposition Partido Acción Nacional (PAN; National Action Party) support managed to transfer the original and new Fobaproa debts to IPAB (Instituto para la Protección al Ahorro Bancario), a newly created banking insurance fund institution in 1998. At the same time, the political move re-affirmed the Federal state"s responsibility to service the growing debt yearly, if not to fully relieve IPAB of responsibility for bailing out the bankers.
It is also important to signal, as mainstream writer Tornell et al. document, that there was an immediate and drastic spike in tax evasion in the aftermath of the 1994-95 crisis, from less than 40 percent of potential income to over 60 percent (2003, 55) . While they do not elaborate on who, one can posit from incidents of capital flight, the greater capacity of business to avoid taxation, and capital"s corporate ties to government that the greater proportion of this evasion most likely belongs to business and capital, and not the poor and peasants (though one might say evasion can occur through the deepening of informal labour, but it is unclear whether this can be considered tax evasion). What can be said with certainty is that while income tax revenues declined with the 1994-95 crisis, VAT revenues remained constant despite the collapse of purchasing power by average Mexicans. This is because, as the OECD reports, the Zedillo PRI administration increased the VAT in 1995 from 10 to 15 percent, having fallen to 10 percent in 1991, to offset the drop in consumption and imports (OECD 1999, 76 ; also see Pagán et al. 2001 ). This constituted one institutional mechanism of pushing the costs of crisis directly onto Mexican society, and disproportionately onto the majority poor.
The 1995 increases in the interest rate on the public debt (Munoz-Martinez 2008, 19) . Having fronted the resources to stave off crisis, moreover, the Mexican government has been rewarded with higher borrowing costs due to increasing public debt (cf. OECD 2009, 23; IMF 2010, 11) . Investor uncertainty as to the extent and breadth of the losses exacerbated already prevalent instability, a drying up of US markets for credit in Mexico, and to a domestic credit crunch. The lack of foreign resources also triggered a shortage of US dollars in Mexico.
As much as the 1995 crisis exposed the risks of laissez-faire approaches to peripheral banking, so too have corporate derivative losses revealed a new type of financial vulnerability for emerging capitalisms like Mexico. 12 While in "normal times" the international community had been satisfied with Mexico"s international reserves, once crisis emerged reserve levels appeared more "modest" relative to other emerging capitalisms like Turkey and Korea (IMF 2010, 9; 29) . As the crisis unfolded in 2008, foreign capital and IFIs questioned whether Mexico"s build-up in reserves was in fact sufficient to cover foreign currency flows (read: capital flight) as long as stress remained on the Mexican economy. The IMF concedes that the shift in capitals" sentiments stem not from a break in Mexico"s "fundamentals" but rather from "relative risk perceptions" tied to Mexico"s US dependence and, more acutely, to its international reserve levels (IMF 2010, 9) . That is, were reserves enough to defend local companies" finances?
The build-up of Mexican reserves from their nadir of -1.5 billion in 1995 has been nothing short of fantastic. In the wake of the 1995 crisis and the adoption of a market-determined exchange rate (floating peso), state financial managers strategically pursued more liquid financial markets. International reserve accumulation was understood as a necessary policy objective to facilitate this liquidity (Sidaoui 2005, 218-9) . The logic behind the policy decision involved crafting a financial apparatus able to respond to the demands of financial capital. Each dollar of reserves that a country invests in these assets comes at an opportunity cost that equals the cost of external borrowing for that economy (or alternatively, the social rate of return to investment in that economy). The spread between the yield on liquid reserve assets and the external cost of funding -a difference of several percentage points in normal timesrepresents the social cost of self-insurance. (Rodrik 2006, 254) To put this on other words, the Mexican state must offer higher rates of interest for its peso bonds because Mexico sits much lower within the international hierarchy of states. The US offers much lower rates of return because the US sits at the top of the hierarchy and Treasury bonds carry effectively no risk. 13 The difference absorbed by the Mexican state is the "social cost of self-insurance". As Rodrik qualifies, the measurable costs of this difference are technical and difficult to calculate due to uncertainty over exact rates of interest, definitions over what should be included, and so on. Given these caveats, Rodrik calculates that the average social costs of the rise in reserves since the 1990s is equivalent to around one percent of annual GDP for developing countries (2006, 254) . This is a conservative estimate since the one percent only applies to the "increase" in reserves since 1990s, not the entire social cost of international reserves.
The exact determination of the social costs of reserve accumulation is beyond the scope of this paper. However, one can arrive at a good enough sense, based on forced to hold reserves that result in the poor net financing the rich countries (Lapavitsas 2009, 115) . Indeed, Rodrik treats the "social" costs of reserves not as social at all and even less so as a problem of power between financial capital and labour, but as a technical problem to be solved by developing countries.
The building up and use of international reserves to support foreign and domestic financial capital in Mexico is nothing less than an expression of the power 14 Rodrik also refers to PROGRESA (2006, 261) . The program targets the poorest households with direct cash payments for education, health services, and even basic food consumption and also helps to fund infrastructure such as water drainage and sewerage, electricity, rural roads, housing improvements, and so on. Here again lies a paradox of finance-led neoliberalism. Financial capital is dominant, but materially and institutionally dependent on labour both to create and realize the value circulated as financial flows and to absorb the risks and costs that come in the form of recurrent crises. Labour is subordinate to financial capital, but essential to its survival. Yet the labouring classes in Mexico have not been able to systematically organize in their own interests, even at moments of crisis when financial capital is most vulnerable and the costs to labour are greatest. The result is that Mexican workers are caught in a Sisyphusian struggle to provide for financial capital. This contradiction, embedded within the class-based processes of socialization, is constitutive of the institutionalized form of finance-led neoliberal strategies of development in Mexico. The experiences of Mexico, by extension, are formative of the international financial system that has also developed enormous capacity to draw together all people"s money for use by a few while at the same time individual states have developed the enormous capacity to socialize the financial risks of a few by drawing on the present and future taxes of the many.
Further research is required to understand the generalizability of the Mexican case, but other research suggests some commonality at least among middle-income countries (Marois 2010) . Indeed, looking to the ongoing Eurozone crisis and the Irish banks, the Financial Times signalled in late November 2010 that any bailout would likely involve a multi-billion dollar loan to the banks, high fiscal costs, further cuts to the public sector, an increase in the VAT, cuts to the minimum wage and state subsidies but, notably, no increase in the corporate tax rate. 15 Furthermore, what can be understood more broadly is that any resolution to the contradictory place of labour in finance-led neoliberalism will not come from such high-level international forums as the Group of Twenty meetings. Indeed, the pillars of reform penned in the late June 2010 Toronto Summit Declaration come nowhere near altering the constitutive role of socializing financial risks at times of crisis. Rather, any substantive alternative requires the restructuring of state financial apparatuses and the reinstitutionalization of power relations to the benefit of labour, not simply tinkering at the policy margins.
As Leo Panitch and Martijn Konings (2009, 83) write:
Instead of advocating the kind of top-down re-regulation initiatives that merely re-install financial hegemony, what is needed is to probeintellectually and culturally, as well as politically -whether this crisis could provide an opening for the renewal of the kind of radical perspective that advances a systemic alternative to global capitalism.
Such renewal will come from labour negating its contradictory role in sustaining finance by breaking with the social relations of power that have historically enabled the socialization of financial risk. The first step is the substantive democratic capturing and restructuring of the state and the financial apparatus. It is this, or renewal will not come at all. The task is organized labour"s to resolve.
